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Abstract 
The article aims to identify a legal structure to establish state responsibility for historical 
injustices by using the deportations and mass killings of the Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire (1915-1916) as a case study. It first determines whether the conduct was unlawful at 
the time it was committed and concludes that the 1948 Genocide Convention cannot be 
applied retroactively to the events in question and that customary international law provided, 
at the time, that the treatment by a state of its subjects was within its domestic jurisdiction. 
The Ottoman Empire, however, breached a series of treaties that provided for the amelioration 
of the conditions and for the protection of Christian minorities in the Empire. The article then 
discusses whether the conduct was attributable to the state under the law of state 
responsibility in force at the time of the commissi delicti and argues that while the conduct of 
the Ottoman ministers, local authorities and the military can be attributed to the Ottoman 
Empire, the attribution of the actions of other entities and individuals involved in the killings 
is more problematic. 
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It is well-known that a state incurs international responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act whenever certain elements are present: the violation of a primary rule, 
i.e, an obligation arising from any binding source of international law and incumbent 
 2
upon that state, and the attribution of the unlawful conduct to the state on the basis of 
the secondary rules, i.e. those on state responsibility.1 A third element is the absence 
of circumstances precluding wrongfulness.2 Should these elements be cumulatively 
present, an obligation to provide full reparation in its various forms arises on the 
wrongdoing state.3 
With regard to state responsibility for ‘cold cases’ such as historical injustices, 
however, problems of intertemporal law arise, both with regard to the existence and 
scope of the primary rules breached (was the conduct unlawful at the time it was 
committed?) and with regard to the secondary rules (what did the law of state 
responsibility provide at the time the wrongful act occurred?).4 In particular, the 
problem has emerged with regard to the alleged responsibility of certain states for the 
slave trade, colonialism and gross violations of human rights of the past.5 It should be 
noted that there are no ‘statutes of limitations’ as such for internationally wrongful 
acts, although the right to invoke cessation, reparation or guarantees and assurances of 
non-repetition can be lost through waiver, acquiescence or extinctive prescription.6 As 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained in the Certain Phosphate Lands in 
Nauru judgment, “delay on the part of a claimant State may render an application 
inadmissible” but “international law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that 
regard”:7 the determination of whether the passage of time has extinguished the claim 
has to be made on the basis of the circumstances of each case.8 
                                           
1 Art. 2, International Law Commission (ILC), Draft articles on responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts, Text and Commentaries (hereinafter ‘ILC’s Articles on State 
Responsibility’), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, pp. 26 et 
seq. The distinction between primary and secondary rules in the context of the works of state 
responsibility was first used by Roberto Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility - The Origin of 
International Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1970, Vol. II, p. 179. 
2 Luigi Condorelli and Claus Kress, ‘The Rules of Attribution: General Considerations’, in James 
Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) p. 224. 
3 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Germany v. Poland), 13 September 
1928, Permanent Court of International Justice, Merits, Collection of Judgments, Series A, No. 17, at 
29: “it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.” 
4 By ‘historical injustices’, this article refers to violations of what are now considered jus cogens 
provisions committed before the Second World War. 
5 See a list in Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, ‘Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical 
Injustices’, 103 Columbia Law Review (2003) pp. 694-698. 
6 Art. 45 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. Art. 45 does not however expressly mention 
extinctive prescription as a ground entailing the loss of a right to invoke responsibility, as the 
distinction between it and acquiescence and estoppel can be difficult to make (Christian J. Tams, 
‘Waiver, Acquiescence, and Extinctive Prescription’, in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson, supra note 2, p. 
1048). 
7 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 26 June 1992, ICJ, Preliminary Objections, 
I.C.J. Reports 1992, para. 32. 
8 Ibid. 
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The present article has a methodological aim: it intends to identify a legal 
structure for the determination of state responsibility for alleged past injustices by 
using the deportations and mass killings of Armenians during the last years of the 
Ottoman Empire (1915-1916) as a case study.9 Two caveats are necessary. First, the 
article will not address the problem of whether Turkey continues the legal personality 
of the Ottoman Empire as far as its international rights and obligations are concerned, 
as this has been dealt with elsewhere.10 Second, only issues arising from Part One of 
the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility will be discussed, and not the consequences 
of the commission of the wrongful act, i.e. the obligation to provide reparation and its 
implementation.11  
The next section will focus on the primary rules, i.e. whether the conduct in 
question was unlawful at the time it was committed. The analysis will then shift in 
section 2 to the secondary rules, i.e. whether the conduct was attributable to the state 
under the law of state responsibility. 
 
1. The Primary Rules: Was the Conduct Unlawful? 
 
The first step in order to establish if an internationally wrongful act has been 
committed is to determine whether a primary rule prohibiting the conduct in question 
was in force at the time of the commissi delicti and was binding on the relevant state. 
This is particularly important in the case of historical injustices. Judge Huber, in the 
Island of Palmas case (1928), famously held that “a juridical fact must be appreciated 
in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time 
when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled”.12 This fundamental 
                                           
9 On the events before and during the deportations, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, ‘Genocide as a Problem of 
National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal 
Ramifications’, 14 Yale Journal of International Law (1989) pp. 262-278. 
10 See Patrick Dumberry, ‘Is Turkey the “Continuing” State of the Ottoman Empire Under International 
Law?’, 59 Netherlands International Law Review (2012) pp. 235-262. 
11 The question of who has jus standi in case of reparation claims for historical injustices, therefore, 
will not be discussed in the present article. 
12 The Island of Palmas (United States of America v. The Netherlands), 4 April 1928, Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, UNRIAA, Vol. II, p. 845. Judge Huber subsequently distinguished between the creation 
of a right and “the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation”, which follows 
“the conditions required by the evolution of law” (ibid.). See the comments by Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Time 
and Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem’, 46 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (1997) pp. 515-520. See also Art. 1 of the 1975 Resolution of the Institute of International 
Law on the Intertemporal Problem in International Law adopted at the Wiesbaden session: “Unless 
otherwise indicated, the temporal sphere of application of any norm of public international law shall be 
determined in accordance with the general principle of law by which any fact, action or situation must 
be assessed in the light of the rules that are contemporaneous with it” (56 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit 
international (1975) p. 537). As the ICJ recently reaffirmed in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State Judgment, the intertemporal law principle applies differently to procedural and substantive rules: 
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principle has been consistently applied, explicitly or implicitly. It is codified in Article 
28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which states that  
 
[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its 
provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any 
situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with 
respect to that party.13 
 
It also finds application in the law of state responsibility: according to Article 13 
of the ILC’s Articles, “[a]n act of state does not constitute a breach of an international 
obligation unless the state is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act 
occurs”.14 
The Armenian deportations and mass killings have been often qualified as 
‘genocide’: in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention proceedings before the 
ICJ, for instance, the United States argued that “the Turkish massacres of Armenians” 
were one of the “outstanding examples of the crime of genocide”.15 This qualification 
is strongly contested by Turkey. According to the Turkish government’s position, no 
evidence has been found of the necessary genocidal intent on the part of any Ottoman 
official:16 deportations were an emergency measure taken in time of war to prevent a 
revolt in the Eastern provinces of the Empire and the killings that ensued were the 
                                                                                                                        
while the legality of the conduct has to be determined according to the substantive law in force when 
the conduct in question occurred, for procedural rules the critical time is when the court is seized or 
when it is to deliver its decision (Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece 
intervening), 3 February 2012, ICJ, para. 93, <www.icj-cij.org>). See Stefan Talmon, ‘Jus Cogens after 
Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished’, 25 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2012) pp. 985-986; Luigi Condorelli, ‘Conclusions générales’, in Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes, Jean-François Quéguiner and Santiago Villalpando (eds.), Crimes de l’histoire et 
réparations: les réponses du droit et de la justice (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2004) pp. 299-300. 
13 See also Art. 11 of the 1935 Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (text in 29 American 
Journal of International Law Supplement (1935) p. 799). 
14 In the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State judgment, the ICJ confirmed this point referring to Art. 
13 and held that “the compatibility of an act with international law can be determined only by reference 
to the law in force at the time when the act occurred” (Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra 
note 12, para. 58). 
15 Written statement of the Government of the United States of America, Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention of Genocide, 28 May 1951, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings, p. 
25. 
16 Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention requires that the conduct is committed “with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. The authenticity of 
five telegrams sent by the then Interior Minister Talaat Pasha, one of the government figures that de 
facto ruled the Ottoman Empire in those years, which would allegedly reveal genocidal intent, has been 
questioned. See Michael J. Kelly, ‘“Genocide” – The Power of a Label’, 40 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law (2007-2008) pp. 151-152. The text of the telegrams is in Shavarsh 
Toriguian, The Armenian Question and International Law (Hamaskaïne Press, Beirut, 1973) pp. 36-
38). 
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result of war and banditry.17 As for the arrest and killing of Armenian intellectuals 
that preceded the deportations, they were characterized as a police operation against a 
terrorist group.18 
Regardless of the question of intent, however, the fundamental legal question is 
whether an international norm prohibiting ‘genocide’ existed in 1915 and was binding 
on the Ottoman Empire. It is well-known that the term ‘genocide’ itself did not appear 
until 1944, when Raphaël Lemkin coined it in his work Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe.19 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide was 
adopted only in 1948 and entered into force in 1951.20 The Convention would thus 
cover the events under examination only if it were to be applied retroactively, or if its 
provisions were considered a codification of pre-existing customary international law. 
These arguments will be addressed in turn. 
Starting from the former, it has already been noted that both Article 28 VCLT 
and Article 13 of the ILC’s Articles, codifying a principle affirmed in the Island of 
Palmas case, deny the retroactive application of international obligations. Article 28 
VCLT, however, leaves open the possibility that states parties may intend a treaty to 
apply to situations that occurred before its entry into force. The ILC’s Commentary on 
Article 13 also envisages this possibility, arguing that this situation would constitute 
lex specialis.21 The Genocide Convention would then have retroactive effects if it 
could be demonstrated that this was the intention of the parties. There is, however, 
nothing in the text of the Convention or in its drafting history that reveals such 
                                           
17 See the comments by William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities. Justice, Politics, and Rights at the 
War Crimes Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) p. 112. Intent should in any case not be 
confused with motive: as stated by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, “what matters is 
not the motive, but rather whether or not there exists the requisite special intent to destroy a group” 
(Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60, 25 January 2005, para. 493).  
18 On 24 April 1915, Armenian leaders and intellectuals were arrested in Istanbul and other parts of the 
Empire and deported or killed (Dadrian, supra note 9, p. 266). 
19 Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, Washington, 1944) p. xi. According to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “[t]he crimes prosecuted by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, namely the holocaust of the Jews or the ‘Final Solution’, were very much constitutive of 
genocide, but they could not be defined as such because the crime of genocide was not defined until 
later” (ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case no. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 4 
September 1998, para. 16, 
<www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kambanda/decisions/kambanda.pdf>). In the context of the 
slave trade, the United Kingdom also declared that it is “[n]ot appropriate to apply modern concepts 
such as crime against humanity to past events” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Press conference 
held in London on 8 September 2001, text in 75 British Year Book of International Law (2001) p. 643). 
See also Christian Tomuschat, ‘Prosecuting Denials of Past Alleged Genocides’, in Paola Gaeta (ed.), 
The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) p. 516, who 
argues that “[t]he word ‘genocide’ cannot properly be used as a legal term to characterize [mass 
killings in the past]. Genocide did not even exist as a concept”. 
20 Text of the Convention in 78 U.N.T.S. (1951) pp. 277 et seq. 
21 See the ILC’s Commentary, supra note 1, p. 58. 
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intention: on the contrary, this conclusion would run against Article XIII, which states 
that “[t]he present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the 
date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession”.22 During the 
negotiations, several delegates also referred to genocide as to a “new crime”, which 
might be taken to suggest that the parties intended to assume obligations only for the 
future, and not for the past.23 On the other hand, it is true that the Preamble to the 
Genocide Convention states that “at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great 
losses on humanity”, that the travaux préparatoires contain several references to past 
genocides and that General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946, which 
mandated the preparation of a draft convention on the crime of genocide, refers to the 
“many instances of such crimes of genocide” which “have occurred when racial, 
religious, and other groups have been destroyed, entirely, or in part”.24 Nonetheless, 
these references seem to address the historical occurrence of such events, but do not 
take any position on the illegality of the acts in question when they were committed.25 
It is well-known, however, that the Judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg supported some retroactivity as an exception to the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle when it is essential for the purposes of justice: “so far from 
it being unjust to punish [the attacker] ... it would be unjust if his wrongs were 
allowed to go unpunished”.26 In the subsequent Eichmann judgment, the District 
Court of Jerusalem held that “[i]t is indeed difficult to find a more convincing 
instance of a just retroactive law than the legislation providing for the punishment of 
war criminals and perpetrators of crimes against humanity and against the Jewish 
people”.27 By referring to previous judgments, the District Court focused on the 
                                           
22 See, with regard to another treaty, Ambatielos case (Greece v. United Kingdom), 1 July 1952, ICJ, 
Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 40. 
23 ‘The Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide to Events Which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century’, Legal Analysis Prepared 
for the International Center for Transnational Justice, p. 7 (<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
Turkey-Armenian-Reconciliation-2002-English.pdf>). 
24 GA Res. 96 (I), 11 December 1946. 
25 In the Bosnian Genocide Judgment (Preliminary Objections), the ICJ seemed to suggest that the 
intertemporal principle does not apply to the Genocide Convention. The Court argued that “the 
Genocide Convention - and in particular Article IX - does not contain any clause the object or effect of 
which is to limit in such manner the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis, and nor did the Parties 
themselves make any reservation to that end, either to the Convention or on the occasion of the 
signature of the Dayton-Paris Agreement” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 11 July 1996, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 
34). Nevertheless, what the ICJ meant was that the jurisdictional rules of the Convention, in particular 
Article IX, did not limit the jurisdiction of the Court ratione temporis, and it did not touch upon the 
question of whether the substantive provisions were retroactive. 
26 Judgment, 1 October 1946, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 41 American Journal of 
International Law (1947) p. 217. See Hans Kelsen, ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial 
Constitute a Precedent in International Law?’, 1 International Law Quarterly (1947) p. 165. 
27 Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 12 December 1961, District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal 
Case No. 40/61, 36 International Law Reports (1968), p. 42, para. 27. 
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foreseeability of criminality and held that ex post facto laws are objectionable only 
when 
 
after an action indifferent in itself is committed, the legislator then, for the first time, 
declares it to have been a crime and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has 
committed it. Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent 
when it was done would afterwards be convicted to guilt by subsequent law ’.28 
 
 Both the Nuremberg and Eichmann cases, however, are criminal trials and do 
not deal with state responsibility. In practical terms, in criminal prosecutions the 
problem of how far back in time one can go when applying law retroactively is 
necessarily a limited problem, as the accused must be alive. By contrast, states usually 
‘live’ longer than human beings (not to mention issues of state succession) and 
therefore, should we accept retroactivity in at least certain instances, we would face 
the difficult task of establishing a time limit in the past beyond which not to go in 
order to avoid, for instance, that Italy is called to account on grounds of genocide for 
the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC. 
In the Eichmann Judgment of 29 May 1962, the Israeli Supreme Court also 
argued that, at the time the events occurred, the nullum crimen, nulla pœna sine lege 
principle had not yet become a rule of customary international law.29 Similarly, in 
addition to maintaining that the principle nullum crimen sine lege is a “moral maxim” 
that gives way to superior exigencies of justice whenever necessary to punish 
appalling atrocities, Antonio Cassese has claimed that the legal prohibition of ex post 
facto laws was still not incorporated in international law at the end of the Second 
World War, nor was it a general principle of law accepted by all states.30 But again, 
the context in which these affirmations were made is international criminal 
responsibility, not state responsibility. Indeed, if one looks at the early codification 
attempts in relation to state responsibility, as well as at the above mentioned case-
law,31 the tempus regit actum rule with regard to state obligations seems 
uncontroversial already at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Another argument put forward in favour of retroactivity when certain historical 
injustices were committed is that such past events amount to what are now considered 
violations of fundamental norms of international law. As the prohibition of genocide, 
                                           
28 Ibid., pp. 21-22, para. 7. 
29 36 International Law Reports (1968) p. 281, para. 8. 
30 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), 2nd ed., pp. 
106-107. 
31 The Island of Palmas Award is dated 4 April 1928. 
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slavery and colonialism have attained jus cogens status in contemporary international 
law, states that engaged in such conduct in the past would incur some form of 
retroactive responsibility.32 This view, however, runs against Article 13 of the ILC’s 
Articles, which does not make distinctions on the basis of the status of the breached 
obligation:  the Commentary states clearly that  
 
even when a new peremptory norm of general international law comes into existence ... 
this does not entail any retrospective assumption of responsibility ... Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to apply the intertemporal principle to all international obligations, and 
article 13 is general in its application.33  
 
The Commentary, however, concedes that states can agree to make reparation 
for damage caused by conduct that was not, at the time it was committed, unlawful 
under international law.34 From this perspective, one commentator has maintained that 
the principle of non-retroactivity does not prevent the international responsibility of 
the states which engaged in the slave trade even though such conduct was lawful at 
the time it was committed. This is so because, inter alia, those states have 
acknowledged their responsibility in declarations and domestic laws, which entails 
“une reconnaissance retroactive et volontaire de leur responsabilité”.35 It remains 
however to be demonstrated - as the commentator herself recognises36 - that the 
responsibility to which the above states referred was not only historical and moral, but 
also legal: at the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban, for instance, the 
Belgian representative stated, also on behalf of the EU and associated states, that  
 
nothing in the Declaration or Programme of Action [adopted by the Conference] can 
affect the general legal principle which precludes the retrospective application of 
international law in matters of state responsibility.37 
 
                                           
32 See, critically, Max du Plessis, ‘Historical Injustice and International Law: An Exploration 
Discussion of Reparation for Slavery’, 25 Human Rights Quarterly (2003) pp. 636-637. 
33 ILC’s Commentary, supra note 1, p. 58. 
34 Ibid., pp. 132-133. 
35 Nerina Boschiero, ‘La traite transatlantique et la responsabilité internationale des Etats’, in Boisson 
de Chazournes, Quéguiner and Villalpando, supra note 12, p. 256 (emphasis in the original). 
36 Ibid., p. 257. 
37 Text in 72 British Year Book of International Law (2001) pp. 642-643. According to the Belgian 
statement, the reference in the Durban Declaration to measures to halt and reverse the lasting 
consequences of the slave trade “should not be understood as the acceptance of any liability for these 
practices” (ibid., 643). See also the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s statement, ibid. The text 
of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action can be found at 
<www.un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf> (see particularly paras. 98 et seq.). 
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 Be that as it may, the above opinion, that applies exclusively when the conduct 
was not unlawful at the time it was committed, cannot be extended to the Armenian 
case, as Turkey has consistently denied not only its responsibility, but also the 
occurrence of at least some of the events, their magnitude and their qualification as 
‘genocide’. 
An alternative way to circumvent the retroactivity problem would be to argue 
that the wrongful act is continuing.38 This argument has been suggested in relation to 
reparations for the slave trade: the wrongful act did not end with the abolition of 
slavery but continues to this day, as slavery severed family relationships, deprived the 
victims of education and placed them in a situation of social and economic 
disadvantage with respect to other groups.39 Transposing this view to our case, it 
could be claimed that the wrongful act is continuing for as long as Turkey does not 
acknowledge its responsibility and provide reparations, in particular the return of 
Armenian properties. This argument, however, cannot be accepted. Article 14 of the 
ILC’s Articles distinguishes between a wrongful act and its effects: as stated in the 
Commentary, “[a]n act does not have a continuing character merely because its effects 
or consequences extend in time. It must be the wrongful act as such which 
continues”.40 Genocide will normally be a composite internationally wrongful act in 
that it will be constituted by “a series of actions or omissions defined in aggregate as 
wrongful” (albeit in theory a single killing with the necessary specific intent may still 
technically constitute the crime).41 However, it is not a continuing wrongful act: each 
murder or other genocidal act committed with the dolus specialis amounts to a further 
breach of the state’s obligations, to the extent that it is attributable to it.42 The 
obligation to make reparation under the law of state responsibility is therefore 
separate and independent from the primary rule on the prohibition of genocide: the 
fact that Turkey has not made reparation or acknowledged responsibility as part of its 
                                           
38 See Toriguian, supra note 16, p. 55. 
39 Randall Robinson, The Debt: What Americans Owe to Blacks (Penguin, New York, 2000) pp. 224-
229. 
40 ILC’s Commentary, supra note 1, p. 60. As the Commission explains, “[t]he pain and suffering 
caused by earlier acts of torture or the economic effects of the expropriation of property continue even 
though the torture has ceased or title to the property has passed. Such consequences are the subject of 
the secondary obligations of reparation, including restitution, as required by Part Two of the articles. 
The prolongation of such effects will be relevant, for example, in determining the amount of 
compensation payable. They do not, however, entail that the breach itself is a continuing one” (ibid.). 
41 Art. 15 (1) of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. The ILC’s Commentary refers inter alia to 
genocide as an example of a composite wrongful act (ILC’s Commentary, supra note 1, p. 62). Art. 15 
(2) specifies that, in case of a composite wrongful act, “the breach extends over the entire period 
starting with the first of the actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or 
omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with the international obligation”. 
42 Art. 14 (2) of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility provides that “[t]he breach of an 
international obligation by an act of a State having a continuing character extends over the entire period 
during which the act continues and remains not in conformity with the international obligation”. 
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secondary obligations under the law of state responsibility does not transform the 
breach of the primary obligation into a continuing wrongful act. 
For all the above reasons, it is not possible to conclude that the Genocide 
Convention retroactively applies to the 1915-1916 events and that the Ottoman 
Empire was in breach of it.43 Any genocide claim against Turkey would then have to 
demonstrate that another primary rule covering what we now call ‘genocide’ existed 
in 1915, was binding on the Ottoman Empire and prohibited the acts against the 
Armenian minority. In particular, it has been claimed that genocide as an 
internationally wrongful act pre-existed its naming and was, until 1948, a sub-
category of crimes against humanity under customary international law.44 The Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert H. Jackson, observed for instance that “atrocities 
and persecutions on racial or religious grounds” had been “assimilated as a part of 
International Law since at least 1907”.45 On the other hand, Cassese opines that the 
Armenian massacres  
 
did not breach any general rule of international law, for in 1915-1916 states were still 
free to deal with their nationals as they pleased, as long as they were not bound by 
bilateral or multilateral treaties on the treatment of their nationals or their minorities.46 
 
 In its Advisory Opinion concerning Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 
the ICJ seems to suggest, if ambiguously, that the Convention’s provisions are 
declaratory of customary international law.47 The Court, however, did not establish 
how far back in time the customary prohibition goes and its conclusions say nothing 
about whether it already existed in 1915.  
                                           
43 This does not mean that treaties must necessarily be interpreted according to the circumstances that 
existed at the time of their conclusion, without taking into account successive developments of 
international law. See the ILC’s Commentary to Art. 13, supra note 1, p. 59. 
44 M. Bibliowicksz, ‘The Armenian Genocide: Legacies and Challenges of a Silenced Past’, 16 Sri 
Lanka Journal of International Law (2004) p. 38. See also Anja Seibert-Fohr, ‘State Responsibility for 
Genocide Under the Genocide Convention’, in Gaeta, supra note 19, p. 354, and the bibliography cited 
therein. 
45 Justice Jackson’s Report to the President on Atrocities and War Crimes, 7 June 1945, para. 5, 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_jack01.asp>. 
46 Antonio Cassese, ‘Armenians (Massacres of)’, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) p. 249. 
47 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide, 28 May 1951, ICJ, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23 (“[T]he principles underlying the Convention are principles which 
are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation”). 
The ILC Commentary to Art. 15 also suggests that “[t]he intertemporal principle does not apply to the 
[Genocide] Convention, which according to its article I is declaratory” (ILC’s Commentary, supra note 
1, p. 62). In reality, there is nothing in Art. I of the Convention that suggests that it is declaratory of 
customary international law. 
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In order to clarify this issue, it is important to look at the positions adopted at 
the time by other states with regard to the events under examination. The Entente 
Powers (Britain, France and Russia) issued a common declaration on the Armenian 
deportations and mass killings:  
 
Since about a month the Turkish and Kurdish populations of Armenia are carrying out 
massacres among the Armenian people with the toleration and often with the support of 
the Ottoman authorities … In view of these new crimes against humanity and 
civilization, the allied Governments publicly notify the Sublime Porte that they will 
hold personally responsible all the members of the Turkish government as well as all 
officials who have participated in such massacres.48 
 
This is the first reference in a quasi-legal context to “crimes against humanity”, 
although – as acknowledged by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) - in a non-technical sense.49 The “new” should not necessarily be 
interpreted as referring to crimes that were unheard of, but rather to the fact that the 
Ottoman Empire had already committed such crimes during the Hamidian massacres 
of 1894-1896.50 There was, however, no follow up to this Declaration and no legal 
definition of “crimes against humanity” was agreed at that time. The Commission on 
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, set up 
by the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, referred to “Violations of the Laws and Customs 
of War and the Laws of Humanity” and determined that the Central Empires and their 
Allies, including the Ottoman Empire, had used “barbarous or illegitimate methods in 
violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of 
humanity”.51 Indeed, it appears that the Commission’s reference to the violations of 
                                           
48 FO/371/2488/63095 (reprinted in Mark D. Kielsgard, ‘Restorative Justice for the Armenians, 
Resolved: It’s the Least We Can Do’, 24 Connecticut Journal of International Law (2008) pp. 13-14). 
49 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, 
para. 618, <www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf>. It seems that the Russian 
Foreign Minister had proposed a reference to “Christianity and civilization” instead of “humanity”, but 
this met with the opposition of the French and British delegations, who were worried that the Muslim 
populations in their territories in the Middle East might feel discriminated against (Cassese, supra note 
30, pp. 101-102). The expression “laws of humanity” had already appeared in an international legal text 
in the Preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention IV With Respect to the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land (the so-called ‘Martens Clause’). 
50 On the 1894-1896 Hamidian and 1909 Adana massacres, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, ‘Armenians in 
Ottoman Turkey and the Armenian Genocide’, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), Encyclopedia of Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity (Thomson/Gale, Detroit, 2005), Vol. I, pp. 70-72. 
51 Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, 29 March 1919, 14 American Journal of International Law (1920) p. 115. The Commission 
was formed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, United States, Belgium, France, Italy, 
Greece, Japan, Poland, Romania and Serbia. The Report of the Commission focuses on state 
responsibility, in particular for the premeditation of the war, the violation of the neutrality of Belgium 
and Luxembourg, violations of the laws and customs of war and of the “elementary” laws of humanity, 
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the laws of humanity was primarily aimed at addressing the Armenian massacres.52 
These actions included, amongst others, murders and massacres, torture, deliberate 
starvation of civilians, rape, abduction of women, deportation of civilians, internment 
of civilians under inhumane conditions and pillage. All of these acts are now 
incorporated in elements of the current definitions of genocide and crimes against 
humanity. The US member of the Commission, however, strongly objected to the 
inclusion of a reference to the “laws of humanity” in the mandate of the Commission 
on the basis that these laws were arguably not sufficiently precise at the time.53 The 
1920 Treaty of Peace of Sèvres also expressly mentioned Turkey’s responsibility for 
the 1915-1916 events, but only referred to “massacres”, not “violations of the laws of 
humanity” and did not specify what laws were breached by the Ottoman Empire with 
regard to such massacres.54 In light of the above, it is difficult not to agree with the 
ICTY when it held that crimes against humanity were “a new category of crimes” 
created by the Nuremberg Charter.55 The events under examination did not even 
amount to violations of the laws and customs of war: Section III of the 1899 Hague 
Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land only applies to conduct 
committed in the territory of another state and there is no regulation of the conduct of 
a belligerent in its own territory.56  
If all the above supports the conclusion that in 1915 customary international law 
still provided that the treatment by a state of its subjects was within its domestic 
jurisdiction,57 it should be recalled that the Christian minorities in the Ottoman 
Empire had been the object of a series of international treaties in the 1800s.58 Article 
                                                                                                                        
for which Germany, Austria-Hungary and, secondly, Turkey and Bulgaria were found responsible. 
Only in Chapter III does it address the question of ‘personal responsibility’ for such violations. 
52 Matthew Lippman, ‘The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: 
Fifty Years Later’, 15 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law (1998) p. 420; Egon 
Schwelb, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, 32 British Year Book of International Law (1946) p. 181.   
53 Report of the Commission, supra note 51, pp. 144-146. 
54 Arts. 142, 144 and 230 (text in 15 American Journal of International Law (1921), Supplement, pp. 
179-295). The Treaty of Sèvres also provided for the trial of those “responsible for the massacres 
committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish 
Empire on August 1, 1914” by a tribunal designated by the Allied Powers or created by the League of 
Nations (Art. 230). The Treaty was signed by Sultan Mohammed V in 1920 but was not ratified and 
never came into force. It was later replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (24 April 1923), which did not 
contain provisions for the punishment of past crimes and was accompanied by a Declaration of 
Amnesty for all offences committed between 1914 and 1922. 
55 Tadić, supra note 49, para. 618. 
56 The Ottoman Empire ratified the Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land on 12 June 1907. Its 1907 version was signed on 18 October 1907 but not ratified. 
57 At the time, the rights of individuals would have become internationally relevant only in the context 
of the treatment of foreigners and the exercise of diplomatic protection. 
58 On the peace treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers, see generally Karl-
Heinz Ziegler, ‘The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers’, in 
Randall Lesaffer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004) pp. 338-364. 
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IX of the 1856 Treaty of Paris expressed the will of the Sultan to ameliorate the 
conditions of his subjects “without distinction of Religion or of race” and refers to a 
Firman (Imperial decree) “which records his generous intentions towards the 
Christian population of his Empire”:59 however, the provision specified explicitly that 
this did not give the European Powers the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
the Ottoman Empire. The 1877 London Protocol concluded between Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia declared that the six 
signatories would “watch carefully” the manner in which the Ottoman Empire 
complied with its promises with regard to the nationalities and minorities in the 
Empire. It also provided for consultation and joint action should the Powers be “once 
more disappointed”.60 The Protocol qualified the introduction of reforms and the 
amelioration of the conditions of the Christian subjects of the Sultan as “indispensable 
to the tranquillity of Europe” and warned that failure to do so would be incompatible 
with the interests of the Great Powers and of Europe in general: to use modern 
language, the situation of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire amounted to a 
“threat to the peace”.61 The Protocol was however rejected by Turkey and the 
Turkish-Russian War of 1877-1878 ensued, which led to the occupation by Russia of 
portions of Turkish Armenia. Under Article XVI of the subsequent 1878 Preliminary 
Peace Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the first 
international agreement to specifically refer to the Armenians,  
 
the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements 
and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, 
and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.62 
 
The provision, then, provided for two international obligations owed by Turkey 
towards Russia: to introduce the necessary reforms and to protect the Armenians. 
Thereafter, in reaction to the growing influence of Russia, the United Kingdom 
secretly concluded the 1878 Cyprus Convention with the Ottoman Empire. Under its 
Article I, the former undertook to defend the latter against Russia in Asia. In return, 
the Ottoman Empire committed  
                                           
59 Art. IX, Peace Treaty Concerning the Termination of the Crimean War, Paris, 30 March 1856. Text 
in Wilhelm G. Grewe (ed.), Fontes Historiae Iuris Gentium (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 
1992), Vol. III/1, p. 23. The Firman mentioned in the Treaty of Paris is the Imperial Edict of Reform 
(Hatti-Houmayoun), declared by Sultan Abdülmecid on 18 February 1856. 
60 Protocol of 31 March 1877, French text in Martens Nouveau Recueil Général, Série II, Vol. III 
(1871-79) pp. 174-175 (the translation into English is mine). 
61 Art. 39 of the United Nations Charter. 
62 Art. XVI, Russo-Turkish Preliminary Treaty of Peace, San Stefano, 19 February 1872, in Grewe, 
supra note 59, p. 415. 
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to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into 
the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in 
these territories.63 
  
The Eastern Question, i.e. the problems originating from the political and 
economic weakness of the Ottoman Empire, was eventually settled at the 1878 
Congress of Berlin. Article LXII of the Treaty of Berlin, which superseded the Treaty 
of San Stefano, provided that  
 
[i]n no part of the Ottoman Empire shall difference of religion be alleged against any 
person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity as regards the discharge of civil and 
political rights, admission to the public employments, functions and honours, or the 
exercise of the various professions and industries … The right of official protection by 
… the Powers in Turkey is recognized ...64 
 
More significantly, Article LXI contains an obligation on the Ottoman Empire 
to  
 
carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local 
requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their 
security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps 
taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.65 
 
A commentator of the time affirmed that the Armenians were thus placed  
 
under the express protection of the international law of contract, and under the control 
of the Great Powers. The natural obligations of the Turkish Government to all its 
subjects have become, as regards the Armenians, strict engagements with the States 
which are parties to the Treaty [of Berlin], and as regards all the Christian Turkish 
subjects in Asia strict engagements with England.66 
 
                                           
63 Constantinople Convention, 4 June 1878 (text in Martens Nouveau Recueil Général, Série II, Vol. III 
(1871-79) pp. 272-275). The Convention also allowed Cyprus to be occupied and administered by the 
United Kingdom. 
64 Art. LXII, Peace Treaty Concerning the Settlement of the Oriental Question (Act of the Congress of 
Berlin), Berlin, 13 July 1878. Text in Grewe, supra note 59, pp. 51-52. 
65 Art. LXI, ibid., p. 50. 
66 Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, Armenia, The Armenians, and the Treaties (John Heywood, London, 
1891) p. 40 (emphasis in the original). 
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If, under the Treaty of San Stefano, Turkey’s commitments had been assumed 
only towards Russia and, under the Cyprus Convention, towards the United Kingdom, 
under the Treaty of Berlin the Armenians were put under the collective protection of 
the Great Powers, which acquired the right to receive periodic reports, evaluate the 
measures adopted and superintend their application.67 At the latest by 1878, then, the 
Armenian question was not just an internal affair, but a matter of international 
obligation: the conclusion of the above mentioned treaties had removed it from the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Porte.68 The actions of the Ottoman authorities towards 
the Armenian minority, therefore, constituted an internationally wrongful act in the 
form of breaches of treaty obligations.69 It is true that the treaties under examination 
only provided for an obligation on the Ottoman Empire to protect the Armenians, and 
not for an obligation not to commit certain harmful actions against them, but, as the 
ICJ clarified in the Bosnian Genocide case in relation to genocide, 
 
[i]t would be paradoxical if States were … under an obligation to prevent, so far as 
within their power, the commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a 
certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs, 
or persons over whom they have such firm control that their conduct is attributable to 
the State concerned under international law.70 
                                           
67 Ibid., p. 35. Rolin-Jaequemyns noted that the Great Powers acquired not only a right, but also a duty 
to ensure the correct implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin (ibid., p. 40). In several 
diplomatic notes, the United Kingdom protested against the non-introduction of reforms and invoked 
the implementation of Art. LXI of the Treaty of Berlin and of the Cyprus Convention (ibid., pp. 51-53). 
The Great Powers also issued an Identical Note (11 June 1880) and a Collective Note (7 September 
1880, sent on 11 September), which demanded the execution of Art. LXI of the Treaty of Berlin (ibid., 
pp. 83-84, 88-93). 
68 The above mentioned Identical Note of 11 June 1880 refers to the “grave responsibility the Porte 
would incur by any fresh delay in the execution of the measures which the Powers agree in considering 
to be essential to the interests of the Ottoman Empire and of Europe” (text in Rolin-Jaequemyns, supra 
note 66, p. 84). 
69 There can be little doubt that, by this time, international responsibility arose as a result of a breach of 
treaty obligations: see for instance Arts. 1 and 2 of the 1930 Articles adopted in first reading by the 
Third Committee of the Conference for the Codification of International Law (Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1956, Vol. II, p. 225); Art. 20 of the 1935 Harvard Draft Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (supra note 13, p. 977); and Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, supra 
note 3, p. 29. The 1856 Paris Treaty and the 1878 Berlin Treaty were denounced  by the Ottoman 
Cabinet only in late 1916 invoking, inter alia, the violation of those treaties by the European Powers 
and the fundamental change of the circumstances in which the treaties were signed (the text of the 
communication containing the denunciation is in 5 Current History: A Monthly Magazine of The New 
York Times (February 1917) pp. 822-824). 
70 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, ICJ, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 
166. Even though, under Art. I of the Convention, the states parties to the Genocide Convention only 
expressly undertake “to prevent and to punish” genocide in time of peace or war, the ICJ held that the 
Genocide Convention also contains an obligation on states not to commit genocide on the basis of Art. 
I, for two reasons: because the provision qualifies genocide as a “crime under international law”, which 
means that states parties must “logically” have undertaken the obligation not to commit the act 
themselves, and because “the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the 
commission of genocide” (ibid.). According to the ICJ, states are also bound not to commit the 
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Whether the international responsibility of the Ottoman Empire arose solely for 
the deportations and for not preventing the killings, or also for the killings themselves, 
depends on whether the murderous conduct carried out by individuals was attributable 
to the Empire. This will be investigated in the next section. 
 
2. The Secondary Rules: Can the Conduct of the Relevant Individuals Be 
Attributed to the Ottoman Empire? 
 
As already noted, for state responsibility to arise it is necessary not only that there is a 
breach of a primary rule, but also that the violation is imputable to a state according to 
the secondary rules on attribution. These rules are presently codified in Chapter II of 
Part One of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. 
Assuming  - as argued in the previous section - that the acts under examination 
were unlawful at the time they were committed, were they attributable to the Ottoman 
Empire? From historical evidence, it appears that the deportations were decided by the 
leaders of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) party, which through a 
coup d’état in 1913 had gained control of the Empire and established a military 
dictatorship.71 The party was dominated by the ‘three Pashas’, a triumvirate composed 
by Ismail Enver (Minister of War, de facto Commander of the Ottoman Army and 
                                                                                                                        
ancillary offences codified in Art. III (conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt to commit 
genocide and complicity) because of the “purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose” of the 
Convention, which would only be promoted if states are subject to the full spectrum of the 
Convention’s obligations (ibid., para. 167). In the previous Preliminary Objections judgment, the Court 
had already ruled that “the reference in Article IX [of the Genocide Convention] to ‘the responsibility 
of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III’ does not exclude any form 
of State responsibility” and that “[n]or is the responsibility of a State for acts of its organs excluded by 
Article IV of the Convention, which contemplates the commission of an act of genocide by ‘rulers’ or 
‘public officials’” (Genocide (Preliminary Objections), supra note 25, para. 32). These conclusions 
have been criticised by some commentators, according to which the Convention is “merely a treaty 
establishing judicial co-operation among contracting states to ensure the prevention and punishment of 
such a heinous crime through the adoption of appropriate national legislation, the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction and the extradition of persons allegedly responsible for genocide” (Paola Gaeta, ‘On What 
Conditions Can a State be Held Responsible for Genocide?’, 18 European Journal of International 
Law (2007) p. 632; Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State 
Responsibility for Genocide’, 5 European Journal of International Law (2007) pp. 876-877). 
According to these commentators, an obligation upon states not to commit genocide can only be based 
on customary international law. 
71 Dadrian, supra note 50, p. 73. The Temporary Law on Deportations was adopted in May 1915 by the 
Ottoman Cabinet when the deportations were already under way. Without expressly referring to the 
Armenians or other minorities, the Law authorized local authorities to order the deportation of 
population on suspicion of espionage, treason and on military necessity. The Law was declared 
unconstitutional and repealed in 1918 by the Ottoman Parliament (Dadrian, supra note 9, pp. 266-267). 
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Commander of the Third Army in Eastern Anatolia),72 Mehmet Talaat (Interior 
Minister and Secretary-General of the CUP and, in 1917, Grand Vizier, who ordered 
the closure of all Armenian political organizations in the Empire and the relocation of 
Armenians on 2 May 1915), and Ahmed Jemal (Minister of the Navy and Commander 
of the Fourth Army).73 The three men effectively ruled the Ottoman Empire until its 
defeat in the First World War.74 The organization and execution of the deportations 
were entrusted to local authorities and to the military with the latter accompanying the 
convoys, while the killings that ensued were perpetrated by several groups and 
agencies, including irregular units of the Ottoman army.75 In particular, newly formed 
brigand units of the Special Organization (Teshkilati Mahsusa), a semi-official entity 
set up by the CUP which also included former convicts, were employed to attack the 
Armenian convoys during the deportations to Syria and northern Iraq.76 It also seems 
that large mobs were mobilised.77 Five categories of individuals appear then to have 
been involved in the events under examination: the decision-makers, the Ottoman 
army, the local authorities, the Special Organization and other irregular units, and the 
mobs. 
Even though the early codification efforts focused exclusively on state 
responsibility for damages caused to foreigners and their property, the general bases 
of attribution as we know them today were already well-established when the 
Armenian deportations and killings took place.78 Article I of the Resolution adopted 
by the Institute of International Law in 1927 declared a state responsible for the acts 
of its organs whether or not in conformity with law or superior orders.79 Ultra vires 
acts of organs committed within their apparent authority or general scope of authority 
were also deemed to entail state responsibility at the time of the events under 
consideration.80 As Eagleton demonstrated in his seminal monograph on state 
                                           
72 De jure, he was Deputy Commander of the Army, as the Sultan formally held the title of Commander 
in Chief. 
73 Bibliowicksz, supra note 44, p. 30. See also James G. Harbord, Conditions in the Near East, Report 
of the American Military Mission to Armenia (‘The Harbord Report’) (Washington, 1920) p. 10 (text at 
<http://armenianhouse.org/harbord/conditions-near-east.htm>). 
74 Dadrian, supra note 50, p. 73. Art. 142 of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres qualified the regime in Turkey 
since 1 November 1914 as “terrorist”. 
75 Dadrian, supra note 50, p. 74. 
76 Ibid. See also Dadrian, supra note 9, p. 274. 
77 Dadrian, supra note 50, p. 74. 
78 The text of the early codifications of the law of state responsibility is in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 221-230, and in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1969, Vol. II, pp. 141-156. 
79 Responsabilité internationale des Etats à raison des dommages causés sur leur territoire à la 
personne et aux biens des étrangers, Resolution adopted at the Lausanne session (1927), text at 
<www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1927_lau_05_fr.pdf>. 
80 Art. I of the above mentioned Resolution of the Institute of International Law (1927), supra note 79. 
See Heinrich Triepel, Droit international et droit interne (Pédone/Oxford University Press, 
Paris/Oxford, 1920) pp. 345-346; Edwin M. Borchard, ‘“Responsibility of States” at the Hague 
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responsibility published in 1928, no distinction existed between acts of senior or 
lower-ranking state officials.81 Furthermore, the attribution to the state of conduct of 
private persons or groups of persons, such as auxiliary or irregular forces, authorized 
or under the direction or control of that state, was already accepted in the early 20th 
century.82 
There are, then, no problems of retroactivity with regard to the application of 
the broad bases of attribution contained in Part One, Chapter II of the Articles on 
State Responsibility, which are a codification of pre-existing law.83 If we apply those 
bases to the 1915-1916 events, there is no doubt that the conduct of the Ottoman 
ministers, local authorities and army officials can be attributed to the Ottoman 
Empire, as they were de jure organs of the Empire.84 On the other hand, the status of 
the Special Organization is far from clear.85 Dadrian refers to it as a “semi-
                                                                                                                        
Codification Conference, 24 American Journal of International Law (1930) pp. 529-530 ; Clémentine 
Bories, ‘The Hague Conference of 1930’, in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson, supra note 2, p. 65; Dionisio 
Anzilotti, Corso di diritto internazionale (Introduzione – I soggetti – Gli organi) (Athenaeum, Rome, 
1923) p. 271. 
81 Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (New York University Press, New 
York, 1928) pp. 45-50. The Author opines that “[p]ractice does not justify the conclusion that no 
responsibility exists for injurious acts by inferior officials of the state” (ibid., p. 49). As Brownlie 
observes, “the application of policies is normally in the hands of subordinate officials” (Ian Brownlie, 
System of the Law of Nations. State Responsibility (Part I) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) p. 135). 
82 See for instance Charles S. Stephens and Bowman Stephens (U.S.A. v. United Mexican States), 15 
July 1927, General Claims Commission (Mexico-United States of America), UNRIAA, Vol. IV, pp. 
265-268. The Commission noted that “[i]t is difficult to determine with precision the status of these 
guards as an irregular auxiliary of the army, the more so as they lacked both uniforms and insignia; but 
at any rate they were ‘acting for’ Mexico or for its political subdivisions” (ibid., p. 267). In the ILC’s 
Articles, the case of “State organs [that] supplement their own action by recruiting or instigating private 
persons or groups who act as ‘auxiliaries’ while remaining outside the official structure of the State”, 
such as those “who, though not specifically commissioned by the State and not forming part of its 
police or armed forces, are employed as auxiliaries”, is covered by Art. 8 (ILC’s Commentary, supra 
note 1, p. 47). 
83 On the history of the rules of attribution, see Jan Arno Hessbruegge, ‘The Historical Development of 
the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law’, 36 New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics (2004) pp. 265-306. 
84 With regard to the criminal responsibility of the members of the Ottoman government, several 
ministers in the wartime cabinet and leaders of the CUP party (including the triumvirate) were 
prosecuted in absentia under the Ottoman criminal code and found guilty by a Turkish court martial on 
5 July 1919 of massacres, deportation and looting. Regional CUP secretaries were also prosecuted 
(Cassese, supra note 46, pp. 249-250). Other attempts to secure the individuals responsible for the 
Armenian mass killings to justice eventually aborted. In May 1919, sixty-seven detainees, including 
former ministers, that had been arrested by the Turkish authorities, were transferred by the British to 
Malta, then under British rule, to be tried before an international tribunal. The trial, however, never 
took place as the prisoners had in the meantime escaped or were returned to Turkey in 1921 in pursuit 
of an exchange of prisoners agreement (Dadrian, supra note 9, pp. 279-289; Robert Cryer, Prosecuting 
International Crimes (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) p. 33). 
85 It is not clear, for instance, whether the Special Organization had been formally set up by the 
Ottoman government: see the testimony of the Grand Vizier Sait Halim and of the Justice Minister 
before the Ottoman Parliament’s Fifth Committee investigating the Cabinet Ministers (Dadrian, supra 
note 9, p. 277). However, members of the CUP were indicted and condemned by the Court Martial in 
1919 for organizing the Special Organization cadres (ibid., p. 302). 
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autonomous ‘state within the state’”.86 As it does not seem that the Special 
Organization was a de jure organ of the Ottoman Empire, the question is whether its 
relationship with the Ottoman government “was so much one of dependence on the 
one side and control on the other” that the Organization could be equated “for legal 
purposes, with an organ of the [Ottoman] Government, or as acting on behalf of that 
Government”.87 This, however, would require “proof of a particularly great degree of 
State control over them”.88 Should that not be the case, the Organization’s units could 
still have conducted the attacks against the Armenian convoys on the instructions or 
under the direction or control of the Ottoman authorities, so that the conduct could be 
attributed to the state.89 In such circumstance, any claim that the Ottoman Empire is 
responsible for at least certain actions of the Special Organization would require 
evidence that the Organization received specific instructions from the Ottoman organs 
to carry out the attacks and the killings or that these were an integral part of an 
operation directed or controlled by state authorities. It should be noted that, even 
though the application for Imperial Legal Authorization to form the Special 
Organization was vague with regard to its goals, as it invoked “national ideals and 
objectives to be ensured through solidarity and cohesiveness to secure which will be 
                                           
86 Dadrian, supra note 9, p. 274. 
87 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 27 June 
1986, ICJ, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 109. 
88 Genocide (Merits), supra note 70, para. 393. 
89 Art. 8 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ argued that 
“United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, 
supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the 
planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself ... for the purpose of attributing to the 
United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary 
operations in Nicaragua”: what has to be proved is that “that State had effective control of the military 
or paramilitary operation in the course of which the alleged violations were committed” (Nicaragua, 
supra note 87, para. 115). In the Genocide case, the ICJ returned to the point and clarified that “[i]t 
must … be shown that this ‘effective control’ was exercised, or that the State’s instructions were given, 
in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the 
overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations” (Genocide 
(Merits), supra note 70, para. 400). While the ICJ claimed that “[t]he rules for attributing alleged 
internationally wrongful conduct to a State do not vary with the nature of the wrongful acts in question 
in the absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis” (Genocide (Merits), supra note 70, para. 401), 
according to the ICTY “[t]he degree of control may … vary according to the factual circumstances of 
each case” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 
1999, para. 117, <www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf>). Doubting the consistency 
of the ICJ’s effective control test with the “logic” of the law of state responsibility (ibid., paras. 116 et 
seq.), the ICTY adopted a much less restrictive test to attribute the conduct of militarily organized 
armed groups to a foreign state. Under the ICTY “overall” control test, for the actions of such groups to 
be attributed to a state it is sufficient that the state “has a role in organising, coordinating or planning 
the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing 
operational support to that group … regardless of any specific instructions by the controlling State 
concerning the commission of each of those acts” (ibid., para. 137; emphasis in the original). The ICJ 
responded by noting that “the [ICTY] ‘overall control’ test has the major drawback of broadening the 
scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of international 
responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons 
acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf” (Genocide (Merits), supra note 70, para. 406). 
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the purpose of the Organization”,90 a Turkish court martial in the Bahâeddîn Şâkir 
Bey and others trial, held that the Organization “had been formed for the purpose of 
destroying and annihilating the Armenians”.91 If the actions of the Special 
Organization’s units went beyond the scope of the specific instructions received, one 
should determine “whether the unlawful or unauthorized conduct was really incidental 
to the mission or clearly went beyond it”;92 in particular, “where persons or groups 
have committed acts under the effective control of a State, the condition for 
attribution will still be met even if particular instructions may have been ignored”.93  
As to the mobs that attacked the convoys and the deportees, their conduct 
cannot be attributed to the Ottoman Empire, even though they might have been incited 
to attack by state authorities. There is no express regulation of incitement in the ILC’s 
Articles on State Responsibility.94 Incitement would thus entail state responsibility for 
the incited actions only to the extent it amounts to instructions, direction and control.95 
After inciting the actions, however, state authorities might subsequently publicly 
endorse them and adopt them as their own:96 in the Hostages case, the ICJ held that, 
although the initial attack on the US Embassy in Teheran was not attributable to Iran, 
the subsequent endorsement by the Iranian authorities and the decision to perpetuate 
the occupation transformed the occupation and detention of the hostages into acts of 
the state.97 It does not seem that such public endorsement occurred with regard to the 
events in question. Of course, the state would still be responsible for not preventing 
the attacks by the mobs. However, the responsibility would arise here not from the 
fact that the conduct of private individuals was attributable, but from the state’s 
failure to comply with its due diligence primary obligation to prevent the occurrence 




Any claim for reparation for historical injustices will necessarily have to demonstrate: 
(a) that a primary rule prohibiting the conduct in question was in force at the tempus 
                                           
90 Quoted in Dadrian, supra note 9, p. 275. 
91 Quoted in Cassese, supra note 46, pp. 249-250. 
92 ILC’s Commentary,  supra note 1, p. 48. 
93 Ibid. 
94 A prohibition of incitement of specified conduct can however constitute a primary rule, as in the case 
of Article III (c) of the Genocide Convention. 
95 ILC’s Commentary, supra note 1, p. 65. 
96 See Art. 11 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. 
97 US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States v. Iran), 24 May 1980, ICJ, I.C.J. 
Reports 1980, para. 74. 
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commissi delicti; (b) that the rule was binding on the relevant state(s); (c) that the 
conduct allegedly in breach of the primary rule was attributable to the state under the 
rules of attribution in force at the time of the conduct; (d) that no circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness can be invoked; (e) and that the wrongdoing state still exists 
or, if not, its obligations are assumed by another state according to the law of state 
succession. In addition, the claimant will of course have to prove that it is entitled to 
invoke the consequences of the wrongful act. 
The above structure can be used in order to determine state responsibility for 
any alleged past injustice. This article has applied it to the 1915-1916 deportation and 
killings of Armenians by focusing in particular on (a), (b) and (c), and has concluded 
that the primary rule breached by the Ottoman Empire is not and cannot be the 1948 
Genocide Convention, as it could not be applied retroactively. It is also doubtful that 
customary international law already provided in 1915 for an obligation on states not to 
commit gross violations of human rights against individuals regardless of their 
nationality: the treatment by a state of its subjects was at the time within its domestic 
jurisdiction, unless a treaty provided otherwise. However, the situation of the 
Armenians had been internationalized since at least 1878 by a series of treaties, which 
contained obligations on the Ottoman Empire for the amelioration of the conditions 
and for the protection of the Christian minorities within the Empire, and of the 
Armenians in particular, under the supervision of the Great Powers. Those treaties 
were breached by the Empire, which therefore incurred international responsibility 
towards the other states parties. 
As to the attribution issues, the conduct of the Ottoman ministers, of the local 
authorities and of the Ottoman military can be attributed to the state under the broad 
bases of attribution now codified in Chapter II of Part One of the ILC’s Articles on 
State Responsibility, which are largely a codification of customary international law 
already in force at the beginning of the 20th century. The attribution of the actions of 
the Special Organization to the Ottoman Empire is more problematic and requires a 
demonstration that (a) the Organization was a de jure or de facto organ of the Empire, 
or, if not, (b) that it conducted the attacks and the killings on the specific instructions, 
or under the direction or control, of the Ottoman authorities. On the other hand, the 
mob attacks cannot be attributed to the Empire, which is however responsible under 
the above mentioned treaties for not preventing them. 
